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COMMENT
THE EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT AS A TAX EXPENDI-
TURE: AN ALTERNATIVE TO TRADITIONAL WELFARE
REFORM
Welfare has become a common topic of concern recently as
President Clinton and his political adversaries begin battle over
the second major element of Clinton's agenda for reform. As a
necessary corollary to, and a direct complement of the health
care proposal, the welfare system presents the next area that
requires reform for a truly effective agenda for change.
A key element of the Clinton Administration's welfare reform
proposal has already been accepted. This past August, the Rev-
enue Reconciliation Act of 1993 ("1993 Act") was signed into
law.1 This action raised the income tax system from a minor
participant in the welfare system to a new, effective tool for
aiding needy families. The 1993 Act revitalized and expanded
the earned income tax credit, metamorphosizing the credit from
a weak method of mitigating a regressive tax rate structure
into a medium for providing incentives and subsistence credits
to the working needy.
This paper analyzes the effectiveness of welfare reform that
incorporates the earned income tax credit as a major compo-
nent. Through a study of the historical evolution of the credit
from a remedial provision to its present aggressive status as a
provision that redistributes income to the needy, a proper basis
will be laid to compare the earned income credit to proposed
1. Pub. L. No. 103-66, 107 Stat. 416 (codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
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alternative methods of redistribution under the income tax
system.
The question presented is whether the earned income tax
credit should be moved from the realm of the "correct" tax base
to that of the "special provisions" that comprise tax expendi-
tures.2 The Clinton Administration has decided that issue by
transforming what was basically a remedial provision in the
Internal Revenue Code into a substantial expenditure provision
that performs not revenue but welfare functions. This transfor-
mation deserves analysis.
I. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE OF WELFARE
Although the term "welfare" is used frequently, there are
many misconceptions as to what exactly comprises the present
welfare system. Many understand that a system of federal and
state grants available to the needy exists, but they do not un-
derstand the requirements for eligibility and the severe limits
on benefits.
Further, it is not commonly known that "welfare" comprises
many varied programs interspersed throughout the U.S. Code
that have accumulated over many decades of welfare-minded
administrations. Before the role of the earned income credit can
be analyzed, one must undertake an overview of the history of
this accumulation and the present makeup of the U.S. welfare
system in order to provide a framework for analysis.
The welfare system, a system of public assistance programs
to the needy, has its origins in the New Deal. The original and
still most significant piece of the welfare puzzle, Aid to Fami-
lies with Dependent Children ("AFDC"), came into being in
1935. 3
2. See generally Boris I. Bittker, A "Comprehensive Tax Base" as a Goal of In-
come Tax Reform, 80 HARV. L. REV. 925, 927-29 (1967) for identification of the provi-
sions that represent favorable treatment and have the intent to promote objectives
that are more important than basic revenue and equity considerations. These "special"
provisions erode the "correct" tax base and constitute tax expenditures.
3. Social Security Act, ch. 531, 49 Stat. 620, 627-29 (1935) (current version at 42
U.S.C.A. § 601 (West 1993)) (enacted as Grants to States for Aid to Dependent Chil-
dren and later renamed).
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As originally enacted, AFDC attempted to provide minimum
subsistence to needy children by making cash grants available
to needy children without fathers. At the time, the bulk of
family income was derived from men, who made up the vast
majority of the workforce. Congress and subsequent administra-
tions revised the program as the composition of the home and
the workforce as well as the definition of "needy" evolved.
At present, the AFDC program provides cash assistance for
(1) needy children who have been deprived of parental support
or care because a parent is a) continuously absent from the
home, b) incapacitated, c) deceased, or d) unemployed, and (2)
others if in the household of such a child and if eligible."
Dubbed "cooperative federalism," AFDC is a federal program
that relies on the states to determine their own definition of
poverty and their own level of benefits within broad parame-
ters.5 Federal matching funds comprise 50% to 80% of the actu-
al benefits, with the remainder consisting of smaller contribu-
tions by the individual states.'
AFDC is presently one of the nation's largest welfare pro-
grams. In 1991, the program provided a total of $20.3 billion in
benefits of which the federal government provided $11.1 billion,
almost 55%.'
Congress significantly expanded the AFDC program in 1990.
The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990' mandated
that states participating in the AFDC program implement a job
opportunities and basic skills (JOBS) program.9 JOBS pro-
grams must have an educational component to provide needy
families with the job skills necessary to enable them to obtain
employment and end welfare dependence.'0
4. STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 102D CONG., 2D SESS., OVER-
VIEW OF ENTITLEMENT PROGRAMS: 1992 GREEN BOOK 603 (Comm. Print 1992) [herein-
after GREEN BOOK].
5. Carol A. Siciliano, In Aid of the Working Poor: The Proper Treatment of Pay-
roll Taxes in Calculating Benefits Under the Aid to Families with Dependent Children
Program, 52 FORDHAMI L. REV. 1171, 1172-73 (1984).
6. GREEN BOOK, supra note 4, at 603.
7. Id. at 654.
8. Pub. L. No. 101-508, 104 Stat. 1388.
9. Such programs are often given positive sounding names such as California's
GAIN (Greater Avenues for Independence) program, Arkansas' Project Success, and
Colorado's New Directions program. GREEN BOOK, supra note 4, at 616-19.
10. Pub. L. No. 101-508, § 5061(a)(3), 104 Stat. 1388 at 231 (1990) (amending 42
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Although President Johnson's Great Society initiative which
constituted his "war on poverty" is often considered the begin-
ning of America as a "welfare state," this is a misconception.
The programs implemented under President Johnson's adminis-
tration in the 1960s merely added an additional layer of as-
sistance to a welfare foundation laid thirty years prior.1
The Great Society did produce Medicare, Medicaid,' and the
Food Stamp Program." These programs remain remarkably
intact and provide the support structure that enables AFDC to
operate somewhat effectively.'4
At present, one of the most important aspects of the AFDC
program is that beneficiaries are automatically eligible for Med-
icaid coverage. 5 Medicaid is sponsored jointly by the federal
and state governments to provide public medical assistance for
low-income persons who are aged, blind or disabled, members of
families with dependent children and certain other qualifying
individuals whose incomes fall below a specified level." With
the rising costs of medical care and the problems with employ-
er-sponsored health coverage, this component of the welfare
package plays a particularly important role. Entering the wel-
fare system does not entail a loss of medical coverage. However,
one problem that is beyond the scope of this paper involves the
automatic loss of government-provided health care for those
who leave the welfare system.
The largest federally-subsidized welfare grant is the federal
Food Stamps Program. 7 Those persons who qualify for AFDC
U.S.C. § 607(b)(1)(B)(v) (1988)). Qualifying participants include all persons in good
health whose children have achieved at least age 3, and child care is available for
children who require it. 42 U.S.C. § 609(b)(2) (1988).
11. See Peter B. Edelman, Toward a Comprehensive Strategy: Getting Beyond the
Silver Bullet, 81 GEO. L.J. 1697, 1710-18 (1993).
12. Health Insurance for the Aged Act, Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 291 (1965)
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (1988)).
13. Food Stamp Act, 7 U.S.C.A. § 2011 (West 1988). President Johnson is also
credited with originating Job Corps, 29 U.S.C. § 1691 (1988), community health cen-
ters, 42 U.S.C. § 254c (1988), Volunteers in Service to America, 42 U.S.C. § 4951
(1988), Head Start, 42 U.S.C. § 9831 (1988), Upward Bound, 20 U.S.C.A. § 1070a-13
(West 1994) and Foster Grandparents, 42 U.S.C.A. § 5011 (West 1993).
14. Cf Edelman, supra note 11, at 1712 n.79.
15. GREEN BOOK, supra note 4, at 604, 1641.
16. GREEN BOOK, supra note 4, at 1640.
17. Food Stamp Act, 7 U.S.C. § 2011 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). It is estimated
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benefits automatically qualify for food stamps.
The Food Stamp program assumes that individuals will con-
tribute 30% of their monthly cash income to food purchases."8
Based on a minimum sustenance level set by the U.S. Depart-
ment of Agriculture, the government, both state and federal,
allocates the remaining amount necessary to achieve that level
of sustenance in the form of food stamps. 9 The Food Stamp
Act provides for 100% federal finding of food stamp benefits.
The states provide management of the program and distribute
the actual benefits. °
The scope of the Food Stamp program is much broader than
AFDC. The particular category required to qualify for AFDC,
single parent with a qualifying child, does not hinder Food
Stamp eligibility. Instead, anyone with sufficiently low income
and assets may qualify.2' This explains why Food Stamps, as a
federal expenditure, has grown to one and a half times the size
of the AFDC program.'
These programs constitute a federal grant program to aid
needy families and qualifying individuals based on differing
income thresholds. It is surprising that although they revolve
completely around an individual's income, these welfare pro-
that the federal government spent $19,765 million on Food Stamp benefits and ad-
ministration of the program in 1991. GREEN BOOK, supra note 4, at 1616.
18. GREEN BOO, supra note 4, at 1613. Not all of a household's income is
counted when determining benefits, and in effect the program assumes most partici-
pants are able to spend 20% of their monthly income on food. Id. at 1613 n.1.
19. The statute itself states that the Food Stamp Program's purposes is "[tlo
alleviate ... hunger and malnutrition" by permitting "low-income households to ob-
tain a more nutritious diet through normal channels of trade by increasing food pur-
chasing power for all eligible households who apply for participation." 7 U.S.C_. §
2011 (West 1988).
20. 7 U.S.C.A. § 2020 (West 1993).
21. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 602(a)(7), (8) (West 1993). Monthly cash income determines
primary eligibility for Food Stamps. There are different levels for different family
sizes, and actual family income is determined under a complex series of rules deter-
mining what can be deducted when making the income calculation. GREEN BOOK,
supra note 4, at 1618-20.
22. As of 1990, the federal disbursement for Food Stamps in 1992 dollars was
$14,184,000, and for AFDC benefits was $10,894,000. Compare SOCIAL SEC. ADIN.,
U.S. DEVT OF HEALTH & HUiAN SERv., SOCIAL SECURITY BULLETIN: ANNUAL STATIS-
TICAL SUPPLEMENT, 1993 AT 332 with STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS,
102D CONG., 2D SESS., OVERVIEW OF ENTITLEMENT PROGRAMS: 1993 GREEN BOOK 616
(Comm. Print 1993).
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grams exist wholly separate from the income tax. The income
tax, as will be shown, presents unique opportunities for welfare
reform.
Any welfare proposal can be assessed based on its ability to
accomplish seven general goals of welfare reform.' Any wel-
fare proposal involves deciding which of these goals deserve
emphasis and which deserve de-emphasis. This give and take
analysis means that a determination of which goals are to re-
ceive emphasis, determines which method of welfare assistance
to implement.
One goal of welfare reform is to eliminate poverty. This can
be accomplished by guaranteeing everyone a standard of living
above their relevant poverty threshold.'
Another goal is to maximize equity. This goal seeks to insure
that those who are equally needy receive equal benefits and
that those who are more needy receive greater benefits.
A proposal should also maximize work incentives, employ-
ment, and national output. This is the basic efficiency argument
which is an integral part of any legislative analysis.' Integral
to the proposal's efficiency is the minimization of the inflation-
ary impact of redistributing wealth.
A specific type of efficiency involves the targeting of the pro-
posal. Any proposal that seeks to aid the needy should be tar-
geted such that most of the benefits are paid to those whom
the proposal seeks to aid. As will be shown, this goal hinders
many of the traditional methods used to aid the needy.
23. See generally ROBERT I. LERMAN, WELFARE REFORM ALTERNATIVES: EMPLOY-
MENT SUBSIDY PROPOSALS VERSUS THE NEGATIVE INCOME TAX 5-6 (1977). Lerman
actually proposes ten goals but the seven goals discussed are the most important and
the most significant for this analysis. Lerman identifies the ten goals as 1) eliminat-
ing poverty, 2) maximizing equity, 3) maximizing work incentives, employment, and
output, 4) minimizing inflationary impact of redistribution, 5) maximizing target-effi-
ciency, 6) minimizing the administrative burden, 7) minimizing undesirable social
effects, 8) maximizing public support, 9) maximizing effective integration with other
government programs, and 10) minimizing implementation problems.
24. Id. at 5.
25. SAUL D. HOFFMAN & LAURENCE S. SEIDMAN, THE EARNED INCOME TAX CRED-
IT: ANTIPOVERTY EFFECTIVENESS AND LABOR MARKET EFFECTS 37 (1990); see also S.
REP. No. 36, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 5-16 (1975) (discussing economic stimulus as a
result of passage of a tax reduction bill); Jonathan B. Forman, Using Refundable Tax
Credits to Help Low-Income Families, 35 LOY. L. REV. 117, 127-29 (1989).
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This paper will further discuss how the implementation of
many welfare proposals would involve a great deal of adminis-
trative complexity. This complexity siphons off a significant
portion of budgeted amounts that could otherwise directly aid
the target group. Thus, minimization of the administrative
burden is an additional goal of welfare reform.
An oft-heard criticism of the present welfare system is the
system's negative externalities.26 The system is said to promote
illegitimacy, broken families, nonparticipation in the work force,
and increased child-birth in poor families." Any welfare pro-
posal should minimize these undesirable social effects as well.
A final consideration for welfare reform is not necessarily a
goal but a budgetary necessity in today's climate of massive
government deficits. Any welfare reform proposal must be fi-
nancially feasible working within the general revenue con-
straints of the federal budget.
The income tax offers a plethora of opportunities for new
incentive-based welfare provisions to aid needy families while at
the same time making work attractive.' In fact, some provi-
sions that already exist need only be expanded to provide just
such a result. One provision which has recently gained new
attention for its incentive and income assistance qualities is the
earned income tax credit.29 Under the basic framework of wel-
fare reform goals, and as an alternative to other welfare reform
proposals, the earned income tax credit provides a newly redis-
covered method to reform the present welfare system.
H. THE EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT
The earned income tax credit ('EIC") is a special provision in
the internal revenue code that has quietly played an important
26. LERtMAN, supra note 24, at 6; Robert P. Burns, Rawls and the Principles of
Welfare Law, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 184, 234-38 (1989).
27. Robert P. Burns, supra note 26, at 234-38; Robert Rector, President Clinton's
Commitment to Welfare Reform: The Disturbing Record So Far, HERITAGE FOUNi)
REP., Dec. 17, 1993, text accompanying n.25 (discussing incentives for increased child-
birth in AFDC).
28. See generally Jonathan B. Forman, Beyond President Bush's Child Tax Credit
Proposal: Towards a Comprehensive System of Tax Credits to Help Low-Income Fami-
lies with Children, 38 EMoRY L.J. 661 (1989).
29. 26 I.R.C. § 32 (West 1993).
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role for needy families since 1975. Before this role and the
purpose of the credit can be analyzed, the basic working of the
credit must be examined.
The credit is provided under section 32 of the Internal Reve-
nue Code.30 As a credit provision, a taxpayer enjoys a dollar
reduction in taxes for each dollar of the credit. Though simple
in application once the level of credit is determined, the earned
income credit has gained notoriety for the difficult calculations
required to determine the amount of credit that is available to
any given taxpayer.31
Until the recent changes in the earned income tax credit, an
individual or married couple was eligible for the credit only if
they had a "qualifying child" 2 in the United States and if they
enjoyed earned income. A child would qualify if it (1) was a son
or daughter, a descendant of either parent, a stepson or
stepdaughter, or a foster or adopted child, (2) was below the
age of 19,33 and (3) had the same principal place of abode as
the taxpayer for more than one-half of the taxable year (the
entire year in the case of a foster child).34
The amount of the credit increases by a percentage of each
additional dollar of earned income. Beginning at the first dollar
of "earned income," the pre-1994 credit phases in at a percent-
age known as the phase-in rate (Pi).35 Thus, for the first dollar
of earned income, and for each dollar thereafter, the increase in
the earned income tax credit is the phase-in rate multiplied by
one dollar.5
This phase-in is limited over a "phase-in range." The credit
provisions cap the amount of earned income at which the credit
30. 26 I.R.C. § 32 (West 1993).
31. George K Yin et al., Improving the Delivery of Benefits to the Working Poor:
Proposals to Reform the earned Tax Income Credit Program, TAX NOTES, Mar. 1,
1994, at IV.B.2.
32. I.R.C. § 32(c)(3)(West 1993).
33. There are exceptions to the age limitation if the qualified child is a student
or is permanently and totally disabled. Id. § 32(c)(3)(C).
34. Id. § 32(c)(3).
35. The notation for the components of the EIC and the graphical framework,
infra, are derived from a helpful economic work. HOFFMAN & SEIDMAN, supra note
25, at 7-23.
36. Pi multiplied by earned income. Id. at 22.
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phases in. This, in effect, determines the maximum value of the
credit because the phase-in multiplied by the cap provides the
greatest credit possible. The cap is therefore the minimum
amount of earned income at which the maximum credit is
granted, or Em.
After the taxpayer's income reaches the phase-in cap, there
may be a stationary range where the credit remains at its max-
imum value. The stationary range has undergone a great deal
of change over the many years of the EIC's existence. In the
first two years the EIC was available, there was no stationary
range at all.17 The stationary range has become a routine com-
ponent of the EIC, and has evolved to encompass a significant
range of income. In 1993, the maximum credit was available
over a range of greater than $10,000.3
The stationary range ends when the phase-out rate, Po, be-
gins to take effect. The EIC provisions specify an earnings
level, Eb, where the phase-out rate begins to operate, reducing
the credit amount by the amount of earnings above that earn-
ings level multiplied by the phase-out rate.39
The basic structure of the EIC can be best be understood
graphically. The following figure demonstrates the interplay of
all the EIC's components and the flow of the credit value (C)
over increasing earnings (E).
37. See Appendices, Table 1, years 1975 and 1976.
38. See Appendices, Table 1.
39. Reduce the credit amount by (Earnings-Eb) x Po.
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Figure 1
The earned income tax credit was established in 1975.4
Congress expressly intended the credit to compensate low in-
come wage earners and low income self-employed persons for
the social security taxes or self-employment taxes they pay."
Congress also recognized the potential of the credit to aid low
and middle-income families. 2
A unique feature of the EIC is the refundability of an excess
credit. If the earned income credit exceeds the family's tax
liability, the IRS will refund the difference. A taxpayer may
claim the credit by filling out a special schedule on the
individual's income tax form.4
Another EIC feature of particular importance is the advance
payment election. An eligible employee can fill out a Form W-5,
Earned Income Credit Advance Payment Certificate, and pres-
ent it to his employer. The employer must then make addition-
al payments in the employee's wages. The credit is distributed
40. Tax Reduction Act of 1975, P.L. 94-12, at 204, 89 Stat. 26, 30 (codified as
amended at I.R.C. § 32 (1993)).
41. S. REP. No. 36, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 11, reprinted in 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 54,
83.
42. Id. at 84.
43. Schedule EIC may not be claimed on Form 1040EZ.
EIC
C --
Em Eb E
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over the entire taxable year, as opposed to a lump-sum pay-
ment that arrives with the taxpayer's return.'
The reason for the advance payment option is obvious. In
order for the EIC to adequately offset even a portion of social
security withholding, the credit must be spread out over the
wage-earning period. Otherwise, the taxpayer feels the income
squeeze during the year from the social security withholding
and receives a windfall with his tax return. Surprisingly, few
eligible taxpayers actually elect advance payment.45
Until about midway through the 1992 filing season, the IRS
calculated the EIC for individuals who it determined to be
eligible, but who failed to claim the credit." The IRS would
automatically recalculate the taxpayer's tax liability after the
credit and make any necessary refunds. Although this was
lauded as a useful measure to increase use of the EIC, it was
later proven to be grossly inaccurate. During the 1992 filing
system the IRS determined that 600,000 taxpayers were eligible
for the credit but failed to claim it.47 Later analysis proved
that the IRS had incorrectly awarded 270,000 earned income
credits." It is estimated that the government lost more than
$175 million from this miscalculation.49 While the automatic
calculation would help solve some of the problems resulting
from the complexity of EIC calculation, it does not help the
large number of eligible individuals that fail to file a tax re-
turn.
Under the tax code, an individual is not required to pay
income tax unless his income exceeds the amount of the mini-
mum standard deduction plus the sum of available personal
exemptions. Social security taxes, however, are paid on all cov-
ered earnings by workers and employers, regardless of how
44. 26 U.S.C. §3507(a).
45. Forman, supra note 28. The Clinton administration has stated that less than
one percent of EIC recipients take advantage of the advance payment option. Tax
Credits: Clinton Seeks to Spread Word of Available Earned Income Tax Credit, Pay-
ment Options, 1994 DAILY TAX REPORT 46, March 10, 1994, 24 G1.
46. George K Yin, Improving the Delivery of Benefits to the Working Poor: Propos-
als to Reform the Earned Tax Income Credit Program, 94 TAX NOTES TODAY 40-56
(1994), available in LEXIS, FEDTAX Library, TNT file (text near footnote 22).
47. Id. (text near footnote 87).
48. Id.
49. Id.
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small the amount of earnings. Further, a self-employed taxpay-
er faces a higher rate of tax than a wage-earning employee. In
1975, the year the EIC was first enacted, the social security tax
rate on employees was 5.85% of the employee's wages up to
$14,100.50 Self-employed individuals paid tax at a 7.9% rate on
net earnings from self-employment income up to $14,100 if that
income exceeded $400.
These social security taxes amount to a regressive effective
tax rate structure. The code imposes the tax on both employees
and self-employed individuals at a flat rate up to a wage cap.
As wages increase, the effective rate of tax decreases. This was
regarded as placing a heavy and disproportionate burden on
low to middle-income taxpayers. Such a regressive system was
viewed as a tax disincentive to work.5'
Although the burden affected all such individuals, Congress
found that to allow a credit to all of them would be a substan-
tial drain on revenue. 2 Therefore, the credit focuses on indi-
viduals that are deemed to be the most needy - wage earners
of low income families.
When first enacted, the EIC phased-in at a rate greater than
the social security payroll taxes.53 This relationship has been
maintained over the life of the EIC, and the rate differential
has widened over time. The role of the EIC as a redistribution
mechanism and a welfare tool has long been recognized. Cur-
rent proposals to use the EIC as such a tool are only expanding
what is already a moderate welfare mechanism. However, now
the EIC has been expanded into a more significant component
of the American welfare package.
As of 1993, section 32 provides an income tax credit of 18.5%
of earned income for eligible individuals with one qualifying
child up to a maximum of $1,434.
50. See Table 2.
51. S. REP. No. 36, supra note 41.
52. Id. at 84.
53. Compare Table 1 with Table 2.
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Figure 2
The amount of the credit is reduced by the amount of ad-
justed gross income, or the amount of earned income, (whichev-
er is greater) that exceeds $12,200 on the basis of $1.32 for
each $10 of income in excess of $12,200. Graphically, in 1993
an eligible taxpayer with one qualifying child faces the credit
scale graphed in figure 2. An eligible taxpayer with two qualify-
ing children faces a similar EIC structure with a slightly quick-
er phase-in rate and a higher maximum credit.'
The effective tax rate structure an eligible taxpayer faces is
quite different. The social security payroll taxes have a signifi-
cant impact on the effective tax rates that low to middle-income
families face.
When such families qualify for the EIC, the effective rate
structure becomes even more complex as shown in the figures
on the previous page, describing the 1993 effective rate struc-
ture applicable to married individuals with one child.55
54. See Table 1.
55. These diagrams are based on rates only. The effects of the standard deduction
and personal exemptions are not taken into account.
EIC 1993 1 Q.C.
$12.200 $23,050
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Figure 3
The EIC does provide a strong incentive structure up to the
stationary point. However, while the EIC is phasing out, there
is a strong disincentive to earn additional "earned income."56
56. This point has been the subject of debate. Economists differentiate between
two labor effects: the income effect and the substitution effect. Over the phase-in
range of income levels, the effects operate in opposite ways on worker incentive. The
income effect of the EIC involves workers seeing themselves as wealthier because of
the additional credit income. As a result, they decide to work less while enjoying the
same level of pre-credit income. The substitution effect of the EIC describes the situa-
tion where the worker sees that work, in relation to leisure, is now more profitable
with the credit. Therefore, the worker will choose to work more. Most agree that the
substitution effect is stronger over the phase-in range.
For the phase-out range, the effects operate similarly on worker incentives. The
income effect is the same as under the phase-in range. More work makes the person
wealthier. The substitution effect is different, however. Because the worker now expe-
riences a decreasing credit as income increases, he has a disincentive to work more.
The income and substitution effects are seen by economists to create a strong work
disincentive in the phase-out range. Robert L. Moore, Recent Proposals to Redesign
714
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I Figure 4
In section IV, a
will be analyzed.
newer, enhanced Clinton Administration EIC
III. ALTERNATIVES TO EITC
The earned income tax credit provides an easy mechanism to
aid low to middle-income families. However, since welfare re-
form has been an issue almost every year since welfare was
instituted, a number of different proposals have been offered to
the EITC: An Economist's Response, TAX NOTES, July 5, 1993, 105 at 106. Some legal
scholars argue that because an individual does not see the effects of working less
directly in his or her paycheck, the substitution effect does not alter work decisions
in either range. Francine J. Lipman & James E. Williamson, Recent Proposals to
Redesign the EITC: A Reply to an Economist's Response, TAX NOTES, Feb. 28, 1994,
1175 at 1176. Therefore, the work disincentive in the phase-out range is not very
strong.
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aid needy families. Among the various formulations, the most
popular are the negative income tax, the minimum wage, and
wage subsidies.
A. Negative Income Tax
Proposals for a negative income tax ("NIT") recur whenever
there is talk of welfare reform. Early in the 1960s, a working
model for an NIT structure took shape. Today, the NIT offers
both a strong alternative to the welfare system as a whole and
a significant structure that could complement the present wel-
fare system.
NIT advocates place high priority on the goals of simplicity,
ease of administration, universality, and horizontal equity.
7
The NIT can efficiently achieve these welfare reform goals.
1. Description
The negative income tax proposes to use the existing federal
income tax system to distribute cash to needy individuals. Un-
der the NIT, a minimum tolerable income is determined for
different taxable units.58 If a taxable unit's income falls below
the minimum income level, the IRS makes up the difference by
paying out some percentage of that difference as a refund.59
The negative income tax derives its name from the concept that
under the positive tax system the IRS shares in all individuals'
income above a minimum threshold (standard deduction plus
personal exemption) by requiring a percentage payment of the
surplus. Under the NIT it also shares in all deficiencies in
income below the minimum income amount by paying a per-
centage of the deficit.
57. LERMAN, supra note 23, at 20-21 (equity), 33 (simplicity and ease of admin-
istration); HOFFMAN & SEIDMAN, supra note 36, at 55 (universality) (discussing a
broader NIT than that contemplated by Lerman); William A. Klein, Some Basic Prob-
lems of Negative Income Taxation 1966 WiS. L. REv. 776, 797 (1966) (negative income
tax has the advantage of avoiding the anomalies of the categorical approach).
58. The NIT could have just one minimum income level determined for all indi-
viduals.
59. The assumption that the IRS would administer the NIT is not unanimous.
See Sheldon S. Cohen, Administrative Aspects of a Negative Income Tax, 117 U. PA.
L. REV. 678, 679 (1969).
[Vol. 28:701
THE EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT
The NIT can be most easily understood by an example. If it
is determined that the minimum yearly taxable income for a
married couple with no children is $2000 and such a couple
actually realized only $800 of taxable income, then that couple
would have $1,200 of negative income. Under the negative
income tax, the couple would be entitled to a payment equal to
some percentage of its negative income.
Such a system serves two main objectives. 0 First, the NIT
has a welfare objective in that it seeks to guarantee a mini-
mum level of income. Second, the NIT has a work-incentive
objective in that it seeks to increase employment by allowing
payment of only a percentage of negative income. As will be
discussed, these objectives compete with each other so that any
NIT structure must be a compromise between the two.6 The
final compromise is codified in the NIT's two components.
a. Maximum Payment
The first component of the NIT is the maximum payment for
which a taxable unit may be eligible. This is the minimum
taxable income that the NIT will guarantee. Such a level is
relatively easy to set as the government yearly determines the
poverty level for different family structures. However, the issue
is more complex than that.
One source of complexity in the NIT involves categories of
taxpayers. The NIT has actually been lauded for being a
"noncategorical welfare program."62 Unlike traditional welfare
programs, an individual's benefit level under many NIT propos-
als depends solely on his income and not whether he is in a
particular category such as a single parent, disabled, blind, and
so on. For the NIT to be truly effective, however, it must have
some categories.
Most NIT proposals break down taxpayers into family units
for purposes of determining minimum income levels. Thus,
single taxpayers, married taxpayers, and families with different
60. See Klein, supra note 57, at 777-78.
61. Id. at 781.
62. HARvEY S. ROSEN, PUBLIC FINANCE 177 (1988).
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numbers of children are each entitled to different minimum
income levels. This still does not present an insurmountable
challenge as poverty levels are set for all of these categories.
However, when the financial costs of the NIT are weighed
against the poverty levels, the ease of the NIT disappears.
An NIT is inherently costly. This cost is a direct function of
the minimum income guarantees. Unlike AFDC, the NIT would
be available to all taxpayers provided their incomes fall below
the minimums. Because of the prohibitive cost, the requisite
income cannot be guaranteed for all taxpayers that fall below
the poverty lines as determined by the government. Thus, some
level must be set that falls below the minimum poverty thresh-
olds.' The welfare objective must, therefore, give way to fiscal
soundness as it has done in a myriad of other programs.
b. Rate of "Tax"
The second major component of the NIT is labeled by econo-
mists as the rate of "tax." This is the percentage of the income
deficit below the minimum income level that the government
will pay to the individual or taxable unit.
Unlike the maximum payment which is hopefully. determined
with regard to welfare and humanitarian considerations, the
rate of tax is a function of the NIT work-incentive objective.
One of the major AFDC deficiencies is the program's effective
100% tax. For every dollar an AFDC recipient earns, that
individual's benefits are decreased by a dollar.' This is seen
as a major flaw in AFDC because the program provides no
incentive for recipients to seek employment.'
63. See James A. Tobin et al., Is a Negative Income Tax Practical?, 77 YALE L.J.
1, 26-27 (1967) (discussing the large cost of any NIT program that would guarantee
full poverty threshold amounts to taxpayers).
64. The implicit AFDC tax rate has been close to 100% since the program was
started. Id. at 1; 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 602(a)(7)(B), (C) (West 1993). In 1967, Congress
reduced the AFDC tax rate to 67% and then increased the rate to its previous 100%
level in 1981. See Robert Moffitt, Welfare Reform: An Economist's Perspective, 11 YALE
L. & PoLY REV. 126, 139 (1993); Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L.
No. 97-35, 95 Stat. 357.
65. See Judith M. Gueron, Welfare and Poverty: The Elements of Reform, 11 YALE
L. & POLy REV. 113, 114 (1993); Moffitt, supra note 64, at 126.
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Unlike the welfare system with its caseworkers and direct
contact with beneficiaries, the NIT is a "noncategorical welfare"
system which would be operated on paper exclusively through
the tax system. The NIT beneficiaries would not have to show
they are trying to find work. This faceless aspect requires that
an incentive system be a part of any negative taxation system
implying a tax rate of less than 100%.
The NIT can offer as strong or as weak a work-incentive as
its crafters wish. By varying the rate of tax, an extra dollar of
earned income can provide one dollar of extra income or no
extra income. However, there is a competing consideration here.
The tax rate, just like the minimum income level, is a deter-
minant of cost. The higher the tax rate the lower the cost of
the NIT. Further, for any given cost, a level of minimum in-
come necessarily implies a certain tax rate and vice versa. The
interplay of cost, minimum income level, and tax rate create
complexity in the creation of any NIT. The final levels will
reflect the crafter's determinations of whether the main objec-
tive of the NIT is humanitarian or the creation of work-incen-
tives. Existing proposals call for between a 33.3% to a 50% tax
rate."
The final complexity, and one that has provoked a great deal
of literature, is the proper tax base for which to apply the tax
rate. Since the NIT is a welfare program based on need, it is
necessary to measure the true economic plight of a potential
NIT recipient. The maze of special deductions and exemptions
found in the positive tax code do not provide the proper mea-
surement in taxable income. Instead, the definition of income
for NIT purposes must be comprehensive.
Some proponents have proposed a variant of the present
positive income tax measurement of income. Under these pro-
posals, many of the special exclusions would be included, such
as tax-exempt interest and scholarships and fellowships above
the tuition level. 7 Further, income would be imputed for own-
er-occupied housing and for home-grown vegetables.' Finally,
66. See Klein, supra note 60, at 778-80 (discussing Lampman-Friedman 50% pro-
posal); Tobin, supra note 63, at 4 (discussing a 33.3% and 50% tax rate).
67. Tobin, supra note 63, at 11.
68. Tobin, supra note 63, at 12 (imputing income from owner-occupied housing
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some measure of wealth could possibly be part of an
individual's income. 9 The administrative difficulties presented
by such a definition of income are obvious and have been noted
and discussed in detail by other more realistic proponents of
the NIT.70
Once the NIT is completely phased-out at the NIT breakeven
point, the taxpayer would revert to a normal tax rate. Propo-
nents have offered an election system whereby the NIT recipi-
ents could elect to continue benefits until they reach a tax-
breakeven point." The election would remove any strong tax
rate disincentive at the breakeven point. Again, this would add
to the complexity of the NIT structure.
The basic graphical structure of any NIT would be similar to
figure 5. The labeling of the NIT elements is the same as that
used for the EIC.
The NIT and the EIC appear to operate similarly. In fact,
the NIT appears to be graphically identical to the EIC without
a phase-in range. However, they are not identical, and it will
be shown that they are not truly interchangeable alternatives.
2. Negative Income Tax and The Earned Income Credit
Although similar, there are significant operating differences
between the negative income tax and the earned income credit.
One significant difference is that the two systems apply to
different tax bases. They also apply to different categories of
taxpayers and operate at different levels of income.
based upon a percentage of the adjusted property assessments and adding a flat per
capita amount for the value of food grown and consumed on a farm to the money
income of farmers).
69. Tobin, supra note 63, at 13. Such an element of "income" would assume that
individuals may have to liquidate some of their assets before the government would
provide any financial assistance to achieve a minimum level of income.
70. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 59, at 680.
71. See Tobin, supra note 63, at 6-7 (discussing possible methods for dealing with
the "notch" problem).
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Figure 5
As discussed above, the NIT would apply to a modified, com-
prehensive definition of income. Such income would be similar
to that under the positive income system in that it would in-
clude interest, dividends, and gains from the sale of property.
The EIC phases in based upon a person's earnings for the
year. Such earnings are defined to include "wages, salaries,
tips, and other employee compensation, plus the amount of the
taxpayer's net earnings from self-employment for the taxable
year."72 The EIC has a much stricter base of application than
the NIT since it is limited to labor earnings.
The EIC also has a narrower category of eligible beneficia-
ries. The NIT applies to all individuals provided they meet the
asset and income qualifications. As explained above, an individ-
ual is currently eligible for the EIC only if the individual has a
child who satisfies a relationship test, a residency test, and an
age test." The NIT clearly applies to a broader range of tax-
payers and would generally provide a greater gross amount of
benefits making it more costly than an EIC with similar benefit
provisions.
72. 26 U.S.C. § 32(c)(2)(A) (Supp. 1993).
73. See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
C NIT Schedule
Em E Ee E
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Finally, there are striking differences in the operations of the
EIC and the NIT. If a household does not have any earnings,
then under the EIC it would receive no credit. Under the NIT,
however, a household with no earnings74 would receive the
maximum benefit. Thus, the NIT provides the largest benefit to
households which work the least.
It is questionable whether the NIT's provision for work-incen-
tives is as great as that of the EIC.75 The basic reason for the
difference in incentives is the phase-in range under the EIC.
The NIT lacks such a range and instead begins at zero income
with either a stationary range or a phase-out range. Signifi-
cantly, a negative income tax is the present earned income
credit without a phase-in range. A comparison of the two pro-
vided graphs will illustrate this.
3. Negative Income Tax and AFDC
The negative income tax has never been proposed as an al-
ternative to the earned income credit. Instead, proponents offer
it as an alternative or complement to the present Aid to Fami-
lies with Dependent Children program.76
Many argue the current AFDC program has a certain nega-
tive social stigma.77 They argue that the stigma demeans
AFDC recipients who retain some element of personal pride to
help them fit in with the rest of society. The NIT lacks this
stigma.
74. Whether the household with no earnings would actually receive a benefit
depends on the definition of income under the NIT.
75. Note that the true work incentives of the EIC are uncertain. See discussion
supra note 56.
76. See Klein, supra note 57, at 781-99 (discussing benefits and drawbacks to
substitution versus a complementary approach); Moffitt, supra note 64, at 138-40
(discussing problems with incentives for welfare recipients with a complementary NIT
system); Tobin, supra note 63, at 14-16 (recommending maintenance of public assis-
tance programs as supplements to a national NIT system).
77. See Gary Burtless, Are Targeted Wage Subsidies Harmful? Evidence from a
Wage Voucher Experiment, 39 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 105, 113-14 (1985) (discussing
the stigma of AFDC). This argument also applies to the Food Stamp program. There
is empirical evidence that many who qualify for food stamps refuse them because of
the stigma that attaches to the use of such stamps. See Robert Moffitt, An Economic
Model of Welfare Stigma, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 1023 (1983) (discussing the stigma of
both the Food Stamp and AFDC programs).
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The NIT applies to all individuals." It is noncategorical in
nature. Because there is no rigorous enforcement of categories,
individuals will not have to endure humiliating procedures to
prove that they qualify. 9 The negative system provides cash
benefits only, and unlike AFDC, neither imposes work require-
ments nor offers social work services. Further, there would be
no need for the administrative bureaucracy that accompanies
such procedures which reduces administrative costs and in-
creases efficiency.
The noncategorical nature of the NIT would remove a major
problem with the current AFDC eligibility structure. AFDC
currently provides an incentive for women to become or remain
a single parent in order to qualify for benefits." Critics see
this as one of the causes of inner-city decay and the destruction
of the family. Fathers of children born into low-income families
are not needed once the child is born. In fact, their presence is
discouraged because the mother can support herself financially
with the help of AFDC benefits. The NIT would remove this
incentive by providing benefits regardless of family structure
provided income requirements are met.
A further drawback to AFDC is the effect of state implemen-
tation and oversight. Each state chooses the level of benefits to
be provided to eligible participants. It is argued that differing
levels of benefits lead to a migration of welfare recipients to
high-benefit states.8 The benefit increase can be quite large.
For instance, in 1992 a two-person family in Mississippi would
be eligible for $96 per month while the same family would be
eligible for $821 per month in Alaska. While it is unlikely any
recipients would move from Mississippi to Alaska, the point is
that there may be a real incentive to migrate under AFDC."
78. This is not a necessary element of an NIT. Proposals for differing NIT tax-
able units include different definitions of family units. Problems created by a family
unit approach include developing a structure to assign individuals to units and deter-
mining the support allowances in relation to families differing in size and composi-
tion. Tobin, supra note 63, at 8-11.
79. Klein, supra note 57, at 782; Rosen, supra note 62, at 179.
80. The extent to which mothers actually act upon this incentive is disputed.
Moffitt, supra note 64, at 136-37. Regardless of the actual percentage rate, with the
present problems of family decay in America, removal of an incentive for further de-
cay would be a step in the right direction. See generally Gueron, supra note 65.
81. Klein, supra note 57, at 788.
82. The empirical research on this issue has been inconclusive. It is argued that
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The NIT would impose a national level of minimum in-
come.' This would remove any migratory incentive. If the NIT
structure were implemented with the existing AFDC system in
place, it could reduce the present migratory incentive.'
As previously discussed, the AFDC system fails to provide a
work-incentive under its present 100% tax rate. The NIT would
remedy this situation as well with a less than 100% rate. If the
NIT were to supplement the AFDC it would improve the cur-
rent AFDC situation.
4. Conclusions
The negative income tax provides a real alternative proposal
to the earned income credit and a possible complement to the
present AFDC program. Proponents have developed workable
systems that provide serious work-incentives to low-income
individuals.
Implementation of the NIT would require some adjustment of
the present tax code. The definition of income would have to be
changed. This is not as difficult as it first might appear as
there has been extensive literature on this topic since the in-
come tax became a constitutional reality in 1913.' The taxable
unit would have to be altered to account for the present myriad
of family structures and the accounting period would have to be
lengthened to accommodate the fluctuations in many
individuals' earnings from year to year to prevent wide fluctua-
tions in benefit levels.86
the studies have a large error factor due to external societal factors not accounted for
in these analyses. See Moffitt, supra note 65, at 137.
83. Curiously, there is no discussion of varying allowance amounts for regional
variations in costs of living in the proposals reviewed. If there is a migratory effect
caused by regional variations in real AFDC benefit amounts, there would also be
such an effect in an NIT system that provided the same level of allowances regard-
less of the recipient's cost of living.
84. Cohen, supra note 59, at 679.
85. See, e.g., DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, BLUEPRINTS FOR BASIC TAX REFORM
53-107 (1977); William D. Andrews, Personal Deductions in an Ideal Income Tax, 86
HARv. L. REv. 309 (1972).
86. See Klein, supra note 57, at 785-86; Michael R. Asimow & William A. Klein,
The Negative Income Tax: Accounting Problems and a Proposed Solution, 8 HARV. J.
ON LEGIS. 1, 6-10 (1970).
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As a substitute to AFDC, the NIT would be exorbitantly
expensive. Because of the increase in the number of eligible
beneficiaries, the level of benefits must be lower than presently
under AFDC. The effect on the truly needy in this situation is
questionable.
As a supplement to existing programs, the negative income
tax would lose many of the qualities that make it attractive.
The objectivity, loss of stigma, and administrative efficiency
arguments would no longer hold.
B. Minimum Wage Legislation
The level of wages in general and the minimum wage in
particular has been the subject of intense discussion and exten-
sive argument. Many call for an increase in the minimum wage
to guarantee, at a minimum, an income level concomitant with
the poverty threshold. Others argue for a dual minimum wage
structure with a reduced minimum wage for "younger workers
just getting started in the labor market."87 Those opposed to
these proposals question the economic value of a minimum
wage and instead propose its elimination."
The ideal method to increase the wages of the poor is to
increase their marginal productivity. In this way the work prod-
uct of the poor would command a greater wage in a free labor
market. However, this method is problematic. An increase in
worker productivity would require job training and basic skills
programs. These are costly programs and their effects would
not be immediate but rather reflected gradually over the long-
term.89 In the short-term period before the effects of such a
broad-based training program were felt, an increased minimum
wage could potentially alleviate many of the present income
problems associated with the working poor. Because the mini-
mum wage is the subject of substantial controversy and has
recently reemerged as a potential tool for the Clinton
87. Ralph E. Smith & Bruce Vavrichek, The Minimum Wage: Its Relation to In-
comes and Poverty, MONTHLY LAB. REV., June 1987, at 24.
88. Id.
89. Significantly, many such programs are presently in place at the state level for
AFDC recipients under the federally-mandated JOBS initiative. See infra Section I.
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Administration's welfare reform, the minimum wage deserves
thorough analysis.
1. Historical Background
Congress first imposed the minimum wage by enacting the
Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 ("FLSA")," setting the first
such minimum at $.25 per hour for "employees engaged in com-
merce or in the production of goods for commerce"9' where
'commerce' was strictly defined as that between the states.'
By enacting the wage floor, Congress sought "to correct and as
rapidly as practicable to eliminate" from interstate commerce
"labor conditions detrimental to the maintenance of the mini-
mum standard of living necessary for health, efficiency, and
general well-being of workers."93 Significantly, the minimum
wage policy was to raise the general condition of low-wage
laborers without "substantially curtailing employment or earn-
ing power."94
Although the minimum wage is a broad-based federal edict, it
is not comprehensive. Instead, the FLSA specifically exempts a
number of categories from coverage. Workers who most likely
would not be taken advantage of by harsh employment practic-
es and also would not likely be paid at or near the minimum
wage rate are exempted. Such workers include persons working
in executive, administrative, or professional capacities. 95
More important for our purposes, the FLSA exempts many
occupations which employ a significant percentage of the work-
ing poor.96 The wage floor does not apply to persons working
in seasonal amusement establishments, persons doing outside
sales work, babysitters hired on a casual basis, and persons
90. Pub. L. No. 84-718, § 6, 52 Stat. 1060, 1962 (codified as amended at 29
U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (Supp. 1993)).
91. Id. § 206(a).
92. Id. § 203(b). This definition has been significantly broadened over time
through liberal interpretation. See Smith & Vavrichek, supra note 87, at 24.
93. 29 U.S.C. § 202 (1988).
94. Id.
95. 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1) (1988).
96. Smith & Vavrichek, supra note 87; see Daryl M. Shapiro, Comment, Will an
Increased Minimum Wage Help the Homeless? 45 U. MIAMI L. REV. 651, 661-62 (1990-
91).
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working in low volume retail trade and service firms.97 Self-
employed individuals would, of course, not need any protection
and are exempted as well.
Since its inception, the minimum wage has fought a continu-
ing battle with inflation. Congress has periodically raised the
minimum wage, but the wage level has never been pegged to
any type of index. As a result, steady inflation has eroded the
real purchasing power of the minimum wage in the years be-
tween such periodic adjustments.9"
From an original rate of $.25 per hour, Congress increased
the minimum wage to $1 per hour in 1955,"9 $2 per hour in
1974,00 $2.65 per hour in 1977,1°1 $3.35 per hour in
1977,102 and by the most recent amendment in 1989103 to the
present $4.25 per hour level. Superficially, these increases seem
adequate if not generous.
a. Prices and the Minimum Wage
When inflation enters the analysis, the true history of the
minimum wage can be seen. In 1947, Congress mandated a
$.40 per hour minimum on hourly employees. The per hour
minimum reached $4.25 as of 1991. During the period 1947-
1991, inflation increased prices 463%."'
Table A shows the yearly progression of the minimum wage
in current dollars and in 1991 constant dollars. Note that the
97. 29 U.S.C. § 213 (1988) (also exempt are persons employed in certain fishing
and other seafood harvesting operations, certain agricultural workers, and employees
of certain small newspaper operations).
98. Smith & Vavrichek, supra note 87, at 24.
99. Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1955, Pub. L. No. 75-381, § 3, 69 Stat.
711, 711 (effective Mar. 1, 1956).
100. Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-259, § 2, 88 Stat.
55, 55 (for employees covered before 1966) (effective May 1, 1974).
101. Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-151, § 2, 91 Stat.
1245, 1245 (for employees covered before 1966) (effective January 1, 1978).
102. Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-121, § 2, 91 Stat.
1245, 1245 (for employee covered before 1966) (effective December 1, 1980).
103. Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-157, § 2, 103
Stat. 938, 938.
104. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, SERIES P-60,
NO.180, MONEY INCOME OF HOUSEHOLDS, FAMILIES, AND PERSONS IN THE UNITED
STATES: 1991, B-2, [hereinafter MONEY INCOME 1991].
1994] 727
728 UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 28:701
real purchasing power of the minimum wage has undergone
significant fluctuation over time due to inflation and upward
adjustments of the wage floor. The nominal minimum wage has
increased since its inception in 1947. Only since 1989 has the
minimum wage consistently risen in real dollars. Most recently
under the 1989 amendment to the FLSA, the level was raised
to $4.25 per hour in 1991, but when the effects of inflation are
considered, the minimum wage's true value is no higher than it
was in 1985. Thus, the recent increase in 1991 has failed to
correct the erosion in the minimum wage's purchasing power in
real dollars."°5
105. See Table A.
106. Nominal minimum wage amounts based on several sources. GREEN BOOK,
supra note 4, at 601, Table 46; Shapiro, supra note 96, at 656, Table A; Smith &
Vavrichek, supra note 87, at 25, Table 1. Constant dollar amounts are based on the
author's calculations using the Annual Average Consumer Price Index (CP1). See
MONEY INCOME 1991, supra note 104, at B-2. The CPI numbers provide the basis for
effective present dollar calculations of the minimum wage.
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TABLEA 116
Minimum Wage (MW) in current
and constant (1991) dollars, 1947-91
Constant $
yearly
1991 full-time
Year Current S MW Constant S MW income
1947 S.40 $2.25 $4,680
1948 $.40 $2.08 $4,326
1949 $.40 $2.10 $4,368
1950 S.75 $3.90 S8,112
1951 $.75 $3.60 $7,488
1952 S.75 $3.55 $7,384
1953 S.75 $3.52 $7,322
1954 $.75 $3.50 $7,280
1955 S.75 S3.51 S7,304
1956 $1 $4.60 $9,568
1957 S1 $4.47 S9,298
1958 $1 $4.34 $9,027
1959 $1 $4.31 $8,965
1960 $1 $4.23 $8,798
1961 $1.15 $4.82 $10,026
1962 $1.15 $4.78 $9,942
1963 $1.25 $5.11 $10,629
1964 $1.25 $5.05 $10,504
1965 S1.25 $4.98 $10,358
1966 $1.25 $4.84 $10,067
1967 $1.40 S5.25 $10,920
1968 $1.60 $5.78 S12,022
1969 $1.60 $5.53 $11,502
1970 $1.60 $5.28 S10,982
1971 $1.60 S5.06 $10525
1972 $1.60 $4.91 $10,213
1973 $1.60 $4.62 $9,610
1974 $2 $5.25 $10,920
1975 $2.10 $5.09 $10,587
1976 $2.30 $5.27 $10,962
1977 $2.30 $4.96 $10,317
1978 $2.65 $5.35 $11,128
1979 $2.90 $5.34 $11,107
1980 $3.10 $5.13 $10,670
1981 $3.35 $5.06 $10,525
1982 $3.35 $4.77 $9,922
1983 S3.35 $4.58 $9,526
1984 $3.35 $4.39 $9,131
1985 $3.35 $4.24 $8,819
1986 S3.35 $4.16 $8,653
1987 $3.35 $4.02 $8,362
1988 $3.35 $3.86 $8,029
1989 $3.35 $3.68 S7.654
1990 S3.80 $3.96 $8,237
1991 $4.25 $4.25 $8,840
b. Poverty Thresholds and the Minimum Wage
The minimum wage has experienced a similar trend with
respect to poverty levels. Full-time, year-round minimum earn-
ings have decreased with respect to poverty thresholds as the
thresholds change with inflation while the minimum wage re-
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
mains fixed. This result holds even after the most recent mini-
mum wage increases.0 7
During the 1960s and 1970s, a full-time worker earning mini-
mum wage and working the entire year was guaranteed income
sufficient to meet the poverty threshold for a family of
three.' In 1992, a worker earning minimum wage working
full-time, year round would earn $8,840.19 This is a little over
the poverty level for a two person family and falls far short of
the poverty threshold for a three person family."0 A worker in
a three person family earning minimum wage would have bare-
ly scraped by in the 1960s and 1970s and, as the world pro-
gressed into the 1990s, would have experienced a steady decline
into poverty."'
Assuming Congress over the years has unofficially set the
minimum wage at the poverty threshold for a family of three,
the present minimum wage is grossly inadequate. To return to
previous levels and thereby restore minimum wage purchasing
power, an additional $1.18 per hour is required to bring the
present minimum wage up to $5.43 per hour."'
The conclusion to be drawn from the history of minimum
wage levels is that the wage floor in recent years has declined
in real purchasing power. This means that hourly employees
working the same hours are earning less and paying more for
goods. The idealistic objectives espoused in the FLSA have not
been achieved. Proponents of a minimum wage increase argue
that while Congress has pronounced lofty principles it has
actually guaranteed low-wage workers a gradual descent into
poverty.
113
107. Smith & Vavrichek, supra note 87, at 26-27.
108. Based on poverty thresholds and minimum wage levels. See Table A.
109. 40 hours per week x 52 weeks per year x $4.25 per hour.
110. $9,212 and $11,280 respectively. GREEN BOOK, supra note 4, at 1272.
111. This assumes the worker is the only wage earner in the family.
112. The 1992 projected poverty threshold for a family of 3 persons is $11,280.
GREEN BOOK, supra note 4, at 1272. A person earning $5.43 per hour working full-
time year-round would earn $5.43 per hour x 40 hours per week x 52 weeks per year
= $11,294.
113. Smith & Vavrichek, supra note 87, at 24.
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2. Economic Analysis
The minimum wage is one area, perhaps the only area,
where economists are in agreement as to economic effects of
policy changes. Generally, increasing the minimum wage reduc-
es employment and generates involuntary unemployment. What
is surprising is that strong theoretical evidence points to the
working poor as the main victims of the resulting job disloca-
tion.
a. One Sector Model
The basic labor market can be defined by a labor supply
curve and labor demand curve (see Figure 6)."1 The labor de-
mand curve slopes downward since more labor is demanded as
its price, the wage rate, decreases. The labor supply curve dem-
onstrates the inverse. This curve slopes upward because as the
wage rate increases, more persons are willing to work.
The labor market is in equilibrium where the labor supply
and labor demand curves intersect. The amount of labor offered
for employment at this wage is equal to the amount of labor
demanded. The wage is the equilibrium wage level, WO, and
the corresponding level of employment is the equilibrium em-
ployment level, EO. A minimum wage set at or below the equi-
librium level has no effect on the labor market because market
forces maintain this wage level regardless of government man-
date.
If the wage is increased above the equilibrium wage level it
has significant effects on the labor market. Assume the govern-
ment sets the minimum wage at W1. At this level, firms de-
mand less labor because the cost of labor has increased while
there has been no corresponding increase in the amount of
114. Shapiro, supra note 96, at 668 (adopting economic analysis from M. SPENCER,
CONTEMPORARY ECONOMICS 545 (4th ed. 1980)).
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Figure 6
revenue a given worker hour can produce for a firm. At this
higher minimum wage, work becomes more attractive 5 and
more people will enter the labor market. The actual amount of
labor employed is determined by the labor demand curve. The
difference between labor demanded, Edl, and labor supplied,
Esl, is the level of involuntary unemployment, as people want
to work but cannot get jobs. Most significantly for our purposes,
the actual level of employment decreases when the minimum
wage increases. In this example, the overall employment level
has fallen from EO to Edl.
If the minimum wage is increased further to W2, these ef-
fects will be even more dramatic. The higher the minimum
wage is above the equilibrium wage, the greater the reduction
in overall employment. Further, the higher the minimum wage,
the greater the number of workers seeking employment. This
simple example provides a theoretical basis for analyzing mini-
mum wage effects, but the actual interaction of the minimum
wage and the labor market is more complicated. Because the
FLSA is not comprehensive in coverage, a more realistic model
115. This is known as the "substitution effect." When the wage increases, work
becomes more attractive relative to leisure. The actual rate at which work and leisure
will be substituted is the income elasticity of leisure and is a function of individuals
utility curves.
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analyzes a labor market with both a covered and an uncovered
sector.
b. Two Sector Model
As discussed, the FLSA provides extensive coverage of many
wage occupations. A number of exemptions, however, remove a
large segment of the labor market from minimum wage
coverage. By expanding the general labor market examination
to a two sector model, graphical analysis will capture these
nuances."
6
Assume that there are two sectors in the labor market. One
sector, the exempted (uncovered) sector, comprises workers and
jobs where the wage rate is determined independent of the
federally-mandated minimum wage. The other sector, the cov-
ered sector, encompasses workers and jobs where the wage
cannot drop below the FLSA wage floor. Further, assume work-
ers are fully mobile between the two sectors."'
The labor supply comprises both skilled and unskilled work-
ers, and the wage commanded is generally a function of the
skills the worker possesses. All things being equal, a skilled
worker will command and receive a higher wage than an un-
skilled worker."' The working poor predominantly fall into
the unskilled labor force.
116. Daryl Shapiro has provided an in-depth analysis of this model. See Shapiro,
supra note 96, at 668-71.
117. This assumption is not based on empirical data but is for analysis purposes
only.
118. This statement is subject to economic conditions. If the unemployment rate is
extremely high, even highly skilled workers will command a low wage. In this situa-
tion, however, a skilled worker would be hired before an unskilled worker.
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Figure 7
If the government imposes a minimum wage in the covered
sector, unskilled workers will want to work there."9 Unskilled
workers in the exempted market would likely be paid at a wage
below the minimum wage.
If the government increases an existing minimum wage in
the covered sector from WO to W1, demand for labor will de-
119. Shapiro, supra note 96, at 669.
734
Waaes Covered Sector
W
W e - - - - - - - -
I I
I I
Uncovered Sector
Ewlaymeat
THE EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT
cline (see Figure 7).2 The single market model proved that
as the cost of labor increases, employers will hire less and even
fire some of the existing labor. Because workers with the lowest
skills produce work product valued lower than that of highly
skilled workers, the lowest skilled will be let go. These un-
skilled workers would include much of the working poor.'
Overall employment in the covered sector will decrease as a
result of the minimum wage increase from EcO to Ecl.
The only available employment will be in the uncovered sec-
tor. Many of the workers who lost jobs in the covered sector
will seek occupations that are exempt from FLSA coverage,
since those jobs are unaffected by the minimum wage increase.
As the supply of labor in the covered sector increases, the equi-
librium wage will fall from WO to W1. Employers will be able
to hire more workers for less. Accordingly, the overall employ-
ment in the uncovered sector will increase from EuO to Eul.
The total effect of the minimum wage in this model is to
produce both "winners and losers." 2 The winners are those
workers in the covered sector who retain their jobs at the high-
er wage. 3 These would not be the working poor. The losers
are composed of two groups.' Those severed from covered-
sector jobs lose whether they are rehired in the uncovered sec-
tor or not as they either receive a lower wage or remain unem-
ployed. 5 These would again include most of the working
poor. Another group includes those workers who originally
worked in the uncovered sector. They suffer a real wage reduc-
tion due to the increase in available uncovered sector labor.'28
The conclusion to draw from the two-sector model is that the
working poor lose the most as a result of minimum wage in-
120. Shapiro, supra note 96, at 670 (adopted from RONALD EHRENBERG & R.
SMITH, MODERN LABOR ECONOMICS: THEORY AND PUBLIC POLICY (3d ed. 1989).
121. See U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, SERIES P60-
185, POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES: 1992, (1993) [hereinafter POVERTY 1992] (educa-
tion level table shows a greater proportion of those under the poverty level as not
completing high school than those with a college diploma or greater).
122. Shapiro, supra note 96, at 669 (citing R. EHRENBERG & SMITH, supra note
120, at 83).
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
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creases. While the overall employment effect in this model is
unclear, employment will decline in the covered sector and
increase in the uncovered sector.
There will also be a capital-substitution effect in the long-
term due to any minimum wage increase. 127 The increase in
labor costs for the covered section financially enables capital
substitution." The reduction in employment in the covered
sector may be permanent because some industries may convert
to automation, permanently replacing labor positions such that
later wage decreases will not increase employment.
3. Demographics
Proponents of a minimum wage increase have failed to ac-
count for the demographic makeup of the wage guarantee popu-
lation. The surprising statistical features of the average mini-
mum wage worker offer a strong argument against using the
minimum wage as a welfare mechanism.
In 1992, approximately 81.5 million persons worked full-
time121 for 50 weeks or more."' Roughly 2.2 million were be-
low their relevant poverty thresholds."' This statistic is im-
portant when considered in conjunction with the number of
poor who are paid the minimum wage.
In 1984 there were 70.4 million workers in full-time jobs."'
2.1 million of these workers were considered poor based on the
1984 poverty thresholds."13 Significantly 800,000, or 38% of
the poor workers who worked full-time, toiled in occupations
not covered by the FLSA and were unaffected by any changes
127. Id. at 673 (citing D. HAMMERMESH & ALBERT REES, THE ECONOMICS OF WORK
AND PAY 112 (4th ed. 1988)).
128. Id. at 673 (citing EHRENBERG & SMITH, supra note 120, at 103).
129. A person is classified as having worked at full-time jobs if he or she worked
35 hours or more per week during a majority of the weeks in which was work was
performed. POVERTY 1992, supra note 121, at A-12.
130. Id. at tbl. 14.
131. Id.
132. Smith & Vavrichek, supra note 87, at 29 (citing BUREAU OF THE CENSUS,
CONSUMER INDEX SERIES P-60, No.149, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS 27 (1985)) (as-
suming a full-time worker to be one who works at least 50 weeks per year for 35
hours or more per week).
133. Id.
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in the minimum wage.3 This translates into 38% of the full-
time working poor who would not feel any direct impact on
their income levels from an increase in the minimum wage.
An additional 2.8 million full-time workers worked, including
200,000 poor, but only on part-time schedules." 5 Of the re-
maining 59.6 million workers who worked year-round and pre-
dominantly full-time in occupations potentially covered by the
FLSA, only 1.1 million had a cumulative family income below
the poverty threshold.'36 Thus only 1.8% of full-time, year-
round workers in occupations covered by the minimum wage
were poor.' Although these are 1984 statistics, the conclu-
sions to be drawn provide strong evidence as to the present
composition of workers covered by the minimum wage.
The effect of these results on the arguments for increases in
the minimum wage is fatal. Over 98% of workers who would
benefit from such increases would not be poor. Analysis of
which population segments compose this 98% does provide some
normative implications for present minimum wage policy.
Approximately 70% of workers earning at or below the mini-
mum wage in 1985 lived in families with another wage earn-
er."'38 A third of those earning at or below the wage floor were
teenagers.'39 These statistics imply that, while raising the
minimum wage will not directly target the poor as beneficiaries,
a graduated and categorized minimum wage could provide
greater help to the poor.
4. Minimum Wage and the Earned Income Credit
How does the minimum wage fare against the earned income
credit? As a mechanism for aiding the working poor, the wage
floor has many flaws. The minimum wage is not well targeted
toward the working poor. 40 Most of the benefits of the mini-
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 27-28.
139. Earl F. Mellor & Steven E. Haugen, Hourly Paid Workers: Who They Are and
What They Earn, MONTHLY LAB. REv., Feb. 1986, at 20, 23.
140. See supra Section B.1.
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mum wage accrue to teenagers and workers who only supple-
ment the income of families' primary income earners.' In ad-
dition, the minimum wage causes unemployment. Under the
two-sector model, it causes a dislocation which affects the work-
ing poor the most.
The EIC lacks these flaws. It is well-targeted to aid the
working poor; teenage dependents who work would not be eligi-
ble because the taxable unit for EIC qualification is the family
unit, not individual workers. Further, the working poor with
low wages would be the major beneficiaries. In 1988, 41% of
the working heads of households 4 1 or single parents claiming
the credit had wages less than $5 per hour.' Of the wives
who claimed the credit 43.9% received less than $5 per
hour.' These percentages are much higher than those provid-
ed by the minimum wage demographics.
As an incentive, the EIC is considerably more effective than
the minimum wage. While the EIC incentive system provides
increasing enticements to the extremely poor for additional
work over the phase-in range, the minimum wage remains
constant.
From an employment perspective, the EIC is preferable as
well. Unlike an increase in the wage floor, there would be no
unemployment effect since the credit does not affect wages.
Wages would be free to float with fluctuations in the labor
market, allowing the labor supply to equal labor demand.
The minimum wage does enjoy a political advantage over the
EIC.15 The earned income credit has obvious federal budget-
ary costs that make passage of any EIC increase difficult. How-
ever, employers in the covered sector bear the cost of a mini-
mum wage increase. This cost is hidden through increased labor
141. The author was unable to determine the percentage of teenagers who held
these minimum wage jobs to enable their families to achieve income levels above the
poverty threshold.
142. The study from which these numbers were derived defines the husband as the
head of a married household except in rare circumstances. HOFFMAN & SEIDMAN,
supra note 35, at 35 n.10 (citing the Panel Study of Income Dynamics conducted by
the University of Michigan's Institute for Social Research).
143. HOFFMAN & SEIDMAN, supra note 36, at 33.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 57.
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costs and therefore the government does not have to justify any
extra spending.
C. Wage Subsidy
A direct alternative to the minimum wage and a possible
method of aiding the needy is the wage subsidy. Economists
have long viewed the wage subsidy as an attractive structure to
guarantee income levels for the working poor, but the wage
subsidy has been largely overlooked by legal theorists.'
The goals of wage subsidy advocates are somewhat different
from those who advocate the NIT or the minimum wage. The
wage subsidy is an effective method of achieving high incentives
to work, high rewards for work, an increase in employment, 47
and equity. This definition of equity differs from basic no-
tions of horizontal or vertical equity in that it seeks equality of
opportunity. Under a wage subsidy, the government increas-
es the chances of the poor to earn income. If a needy person
chooses not to pursue this opportunity, "he has no claim on
government resources." 5 '
The wage subsidy concept is simple. It is a three-part mecha-
nism to provide labor-supply side impetus to employment as
well as improvement of income levels. It consists of a target
wage rate, a subsidy rate, and categorical eligibility defini-
tions. 5'
146. Two recent proposals by legal scholars have actually suggested use of a wage
subsidy. See Jonathan B. Forman, Expanding the Earned Income Tax Credit: Clinton
Style, TAX NOTES, Jan. 11, 1993, at 231; James E. Williamson & Francine J. Lipman,
The New Earned Income Tax Credit: Too Complex for the Targeted Taxpayers?, TAX
NOTES, Nov. 9, 1992, at 789. Jonathan Forman has proposed converting the EIC into
a wage subsidy credit arguing the change would "better target the benefits to the
working poor and increase the work incentives associated with the earned income
credit." Jonathan B. Forman, Improving the Earned Income Credit: Transition to a
Wage Subsidy Credit for the Working Poor, 16 FLA. ST. L. REV. 41, 81 (1988).
147. MICHAEL C. BARTH ET AL., TOWARD AN EFFECTIVE INCOME SUPPORT SYSTEM:
PROBLEMS, PROSPECTS, AND CHOICES 72 (1974).
148. LERMAN, supra note 23, at 3.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. David M. Betson & John H. Bishop, Wage Incentive and Distributioned Effects,
in JOBS FOR DISADVANTAGED WORKERS: THE ECONOAIuCS OF EMPLOYMENT SUBSIDIES
187, 193 (Robert H. Havenman & John L. Palmer eds., 1982).
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The government first establishes a socially determined wage
rate. Wages falling below this level are then eligible for subsi-
dies. The process for this determination would be similar to
that discussed under the NIT and EIC using categorical poverty
thresholds.
The subsidy rat6 chosen would be the difference between the
actual wage rate and the target wage rate. To be economically
feasible, the wage subsidy would be some level less than 100%.
Further, by setting the subsidy rate below 100%, the govern-
ment can provide a strong incentive system. The closer the
subsidy approaches 100%, however, the greater the incentive to
work more hours.152
Finally, the system may or may not be universal. The wage
subsidy could easily be guaranteed to all workers whose wage
rate falls below the target rate. Due to budgetary and target
concerns however, the system should incorporate certain cate-
gorical definitions that limit subsidy eligibility.5 '
In deference to budgetary and welfare considerations, the
wage subsidy could be limited solely to the working poor."'
Specifically, the subsidy could be available only to principal
earners, generally the working parent or parents, living in a
family with children.'55 The subsidy could then be varied by
family size to allow families with greater need to earn more
income. 156
A basic example will clarify these three elements. The gov-
ernment could give a family's principal wage earner a subsidy
equal to 50% of the difference between $6.60, the socially deter-
mined wage rate, and the worker's hourly minimum wage. This
would guarantee income concomitant with the poverty threshold
of a three person family in 1992. A minimum wage, full-time,
152. Thus, to provide the greatest incentive, the subsidy rate must be both less
than 100% and yet close to 100%.
153. Betson & Bishop, supra note 151, at 193-94. Robert D. Reischauer, Welfare
Reform and the Working Poor, in WORK AND WELFARE: THE CASE FOR NEW DIREC-
TIONS IN NATIONAL POLICY 35, 46 (Center for National Policy ed., 1987).
154. BARTH, supra note 147, at 73.
155. Ben W. Heineman, Jr., Welfare Reform Revisited: New Consensus and Old
Dilemmas, in WORK AND WELFARE: THE CASE FOR NEW DIRECTIONS IN NATIONAL
POLICY 13, 16 (Center for National Policy ed., 1987).
156. Id.
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full-year worker would receive a wage subsidy of approximately
$2,444. For incomes above the three person family poverty
threshold, the wage subsidy declines by a fraction of a dollar
for each dollar earned over the threshold until it falls to zero.
Figure 8
Like the earned income tax credit, and unlike the NIT, bene-
fits from the wage subsidy are a function of whether a person
works. The subsidy augments the recipient's hourly wage. The
more hours worked, the more subsidy to which the person is
entitled. If the persons fails to work any hours, he receives no
subsidy.
Figure 8 demonstrates the basic nature of the wage subsi-
dy."57 As in previous graphical depictions, the labor supply
curve slopes upward as an increase in wage would entice more
workers to enter the labor market. The labor demand curve
slopes downward evidencing employers' decreasing demand for
labor as wages increase.
Basic Wage Subsidy
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157. Figure adapted from Robert I. Lerman, A Comparison of Employer and Work-
er Wage Subsidies, in JOBS FOR DISADVANTAGED WORKERS: THE ECONOMICS OF EM-
PLOYMENT SUBSIDIES, 159, 164, fig. 1 (Robert H. Haveman & John L. Palmer eds.,
1982).
1994] 741
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
N represents the equilibrium level of employment at Wm, the
market determined equilibrium wage level. Wg represents the
level of wage guaranteed by the wage subsidy. Wg is, therefore,
the actual wage workers would face if Congress implemented a
wage subsidy."' 8 Employers, however, would still face the mar-
ket determined wage because the government subsidy would be
paid directly to workers.'59
The effective wage of workers would increase, drawing more
workers into the labor market just as would happen under a
minimum wage regime. With a minimum wage however, this
would amount to a decrease in employment from N to LD. One
of the principal strengths of the wage subsidy is that it does
not entail this labor dislocation. Employment remains at the
same level, N, because the effective wage that employers face
has not changed.
Complex Wage Subsidy Model
W
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Figure 9
158. This is a basic illustration. The functioning of the subsidy rate implies that
individual workers face differing actual wages based on the amount by which their
real wage falls below the target wage. For the purposes of this discussion, the as-
sumption of a single wage subsidy level like a minimum wage level is an accurate
simplification.
159. A wage subsidy does not have to take this form. A number of employer subsi-
dies have been proposed. Such employer proposals differ significantly in their labor
market effects. See Lerman, supra note 157, at 161-63.
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The wage subsidy would entail a large movement of workers
into the labor force, 6 ' as figure 9 depicts.' This would
cause the labor supply curve to shift out for all levels of wage
over the relevant subsidy range to LS2. The increase in labor
for wage rates below W1, the socially determined government
wage level, would cause wages to further decline as employers
must pay less to entice workers to accept employment. Thus,
the employer's cost per worker declines for wages below W1,
causing the labor demand curve to shift outward to LD2 over
this wage range.'62 The more complex wage subsidy graph
shows the effect of these labor supply and labor demand in-
creases. The market comes to a new equilibrium at a higher
level of employment, with employers paying lower effective
wages and employees receiving higher effective wages. The
difference between the effective wage received by employees,
W1, and the wage paid by employers, W2, is the subsidy per
worker paid by the government. The detrimental labor effects of
the minimum wage model are avoided by the wage subsidy,
and, in fact, a wage subsidy would also result in a large in-
crease in employment.
1. Wage Subsidy and the NIT
The wage subsidy is much more efficient in creating work
incentives than a negative income tax. With the wage subsidy,
additional earnings are supplemented instead of being taxed.
The benefits for sub-target wage workers are limited only by
their physical ability to work long hours. By not focusing on
gross earnings, the wage subsidy provides a significant incen-
tive to work as many hours as possible. However, as the benefit
decreases for every extra hour worked, the NIT incorporates
significant disincentives for greater work.6 ' As outlined in the
NIT discussion, work incentive is the major criticism of the NIT
structure.
Some characteristics of the wage subsidy imply easier imple-
mentation than the NIT. Unlike a categorical NIT, the wage
160. Id. at 163-65.
161. Lerman, supra note 157, at 164, fig. 1.
162. Id.
163. Betson & Bishop, supra note 151, at 190.
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subsidy involves neither asset nor work tests, and the measure-
ment of unearned income is unnecessary.' Nevertheless, the
wage subsidy is not wholly void of administrative complexity.
To determine eligibility, the hours of work must be mea-
sured.165 If Congress chooses to implement the wage subsidy
on a categorical basis, the status determination of primary
earners or heads of households would entail additional compli-
cations.66 The effect is to render a determination of greater
administrative feasibility between the wage subsidy and the
NIT ambiguous.
The conclusion is that the labor supply decrease from imple-
mentation would be less under the wage subsidy than under
the negative income tax. Thus, because the wage subsidy has
little negative impact on labor supply, it is a more effective
means of raising benefit recipients' income.
2. Wage Subsidy and the Minimum Wage
The wage subsidy and the minimum wage are closely related
as both utilize the wage as the instrument for guaranteeing
income. However, the secondary effects between these methods
of wage manipulation are, however, significantly different.
A wage subsidy could be tailored to aid only those workers
needing an increase in wages as opposed to all workers who
earn the minimum wage, many of whom are not poor. Specifi-
cally, the wage subsidy could be available only to the heads of
low-wage families. Alternatively, the wage subsidy could apply
to all low-wage earners. There would not have to be exceptions
such as those codified in the FLSA.
Both the minimum wage and wage subsidy provide effective
incentive systems. Under both, work is required for eligibility.
Only the wage subsidy, however, could be structured to allow
for a phase-out for earnings above a threshold level. Most sig-
nificantly, the wage subsidy lacks the negative labor market ef-
fects of the minimum wage. Wage subsidies increase
164. Id at 193.
165. Id.
166. Id.
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employment by increasing the desire of the poor to work while
not affecting the costs of hiring them. The minimum wage de-
creases overall employment. Clearly, based on labor market
considerations alone, the wage subsidy is more advantageous
than the minimum wage.
3. Wage Subsidy and AFDC
Based on the demographic data outlined with the minimum
wage, the wage subsidy would not be an effective method to aid
heads of single-parent families with young children. These peo-
ple are often outside the labor force.
This implies that a wage subsidy should not be a substitute
for AFDC. Instead, AFDC should remain in place with a wage
subsidy as a supplement to provide benefits for those in need
who currently do not receive aid, namely the working poor.
The earned income tax credit targets the same group of
needy individuals. Thus, the wage subsidy would act as a sub-
stitute program to the EIC. But there are significant drawbacks
to a wage subsidy that deserve mention.
4. Benefits and Drawbacks of the Wage Subsidy
A number of wage subsidy benefits have been enumerated,
but there are significant drawbacks to the subsidy that temper
the attractiveness of wage subsidy proposals. Unlike the NIT
and EIC phase-out ranges, which positively tax increases in
hours worked, the wage subsidy taxes incremental increases in
wage rates. This provides a disincentive for workers to make
the necessary investment to increase an individual's hourly
wage rate.
There is also a major incentive to cheat. The wage subsidy
can be maximized by underreporting wages earned and
overreporting hours worked. This provides an incentive for
collusion between employees and employers.'
167. BARTH, supra note 147, at 73.
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Without a major categorical structure, such as limiting bene-
fits to primary earners in families below the poverty line, the
wage subsidy would have the same targeting problems as the
minimum wage. Many low wage employees are members of
families that are not poor.'68 Greater targeting of the wage
subsidy would eliminate this problem but would entail greater
administrative complexity.'69
Administrative complexity is endemic with a wage subsidy
regardless of categorical eligibility. Major issues that would
have to be addressed include non-straight-line hourly earnings
such as tips and fringe benefits. 7 ' These items present a
problem of what measures should be taken with regard to the
reporting of hours and wages to prevent fraud. Benefits would
have to be paid to the employee either directly or through the
employer. If paid through the employer, problems associated
with employer disincentives to hire employees receiving govern-
ment aid arise.'7 '
The wage subsidy is not a comprehensive welfare program. It
fails to recognize that a number of the poor are unable to find
a job through no fault of their own.' Further, a basic wage
subsidy program neglects to provide for workers who are tempo-
rarily laid off, a situation occurring with increasing frequen-
cy. '7 Presumably, these individuals need income assistance as
much, if not more, than the working poor.
If the wage subsidy is provided in each paycheck, it would
require changes to the tax code as well. New provisions would
be necessary to recapture subsidies given to those whose situa-
tions improve over the year. For example, suppose the govern-
ment implements a wage subsidy but limits benefits to primary
earners in families below their respective poverty lines. If a
subsidy is provided throughout the year to the primary earner
168. Shapiro, supra note 96, at 661; Smith & Vavrichek, supra note 87, at 27.
169. Id. BARTH, supra note 147, at 73.
170. Id.
171. Shapiro, supra note 96, at 693 (Shapiro takes this conclusion from
EHRENBERG & SMITH, supra note 120, at 117.
172. See LERMAN, supra note 23, at 19 (discussing willingness and opportunities
for work).
173. Wage subsidy programs incorporating unemployment benefits and temporary
layoff coverage can be constructed. See, e.g., LERMAN, supra note 23, at 9-28.
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based on projected earnings, but during the year another family
member gains employment which places the family over the
relevant poverty line, subsidies paid to the primary earner
would have to be recaptured.
Clearly, the wage subsidy offers unique features as a welfare
program. Wage subsidies have many drawbacks as well, there-
fore, some, but not all welfare reform goals, can be achieved.
The major negative consideration for a wage subsidy proposal is
the administrative complexity.
IV. WELFARE REFORM UNDER THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION
The Clinton Administration's particular welfare proposal
should be analyzed, with an understanding that there is wide
popular support for welfare reform. President Clinton has set
lofty goals for welfare reform, promising a significant alteration
of the present system of public support. Although the specific
elements of the coming welfare reform are unknown, the basic
framework has been articulated by the Administration and has
been the subject of wide comment and criticism.
President Clinton's goal, loudly touted during his election
campaign, is to "end welfare as we know it."'74 To that end,
Clinton will send a welfare reform bill containing four or five of
his campaign promises to Congress later this year.75 The gen-
eral thrust of the Administration's welfare reform involves four
key areas. 76
A. Improve Child Support
Presently, only a third of single parents receive the court-
ordered child support payments.'77 The administration will
propose two methods to improve collection of child support.
174. David Whitman & Matthew Cooper, Fixing the Welfare Mess, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP., Dec. 13, 1993, at 30.
175. William Claiborne, How Hard a Push on Welfare Reform?; Clinton Bill Likely
in 1994, but Depth of Commitment is Uncertain, THE WASH. POST Dec. 27, 1993, at
Al.
176. Karen Schneider, Rethinking Welfare; System's Overhaul to Push Recipients
into Jobs that Pay, THE DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Aug. 29, 1993, at 1J.
177. Id.
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First, the reform bill will require single mothers to establish
paternity at the hospital when the child is born.17 The IRS
will then be instructed to withhold wages from fathers who are
delinquent in their child support payments or who refuse to
pay.
79
Second, the bill will propose child support assurance. 80 Un-
der this program, the government will guarantee a minimum
payment to mothers if the fathers cannot be located.'8 ' The
guaranteed payment will be graduated providing, for example,
$3,000 per year for the first child and $1,000 per year for the
second child of a single mother.'82
B. Expand Education and Training Programs
The bill will expand the Family Support Act of 1988, which
required state AFDC programs to include education, training
and job placement for virtually all able-bodied recipients with
children over the age of three."8' These programs, known as
Job Opportunity and Basic Skills Programs (JOBS), enrolled
about 7% of adult welfare recipients in 1992." President
Clinton wants to expand that number dramatically. While all
states receiving federal AFDC funds must implement such pro-
grams, states have been slow to respond.'85 The administra-
tion has expressed interest in increasing the budget allocations
for the federal portion of these programs, and others are argu-
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Pub. L. No. 100-485, 102 Stat. 2343 (1988) (current version at 42 U.S.C.S. §
1305 (Law Co-Op. 1993)).
184. Robert Rector, President Clinton's Commitment to Welfare Reform: The Dis-
turbing Record So Far, HERITAGE FOUND. REP., Dec. 17, 1993.
185. Under the current program structure, a state must require non-exempt AFDC
recipients to participate in the JOBS program. Federal matching for JOBS program
costs is available as a capped entitlement limited to $1.1 billion in fiscal year 1994.
The Federal match is 90% for expenditures up to a capped amount and 60% for
expenditures beyond that amount. Due to budget pressures at the state level, as of
1992 40% of the federal funds allocated to the program went unspent. See GREEN
BOOK, supra note 4, at 621; Gueron, supra note 65, at 121.
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ing for an expansion of the requirements for participants in
order to broaden the program's enrollment.'86
C. Time Limit for Receipt of Welfare
One of the most controversial elements of the bill, which has
already been the subject of widespread criticism by some liberal
politicians, is the proposal to limit welfare mothers' checks to
two years or thirty months.8 7 There is no consensus on
whether AFDC recipients, once forcibly removed from the pro-
gram, will be able to reapply later for benefits.
More conservative commentators have called for different
time limit structures. The GOP proposal includes a two year
limit on benefits while requiring recipients to join a job training
program during their AFDC eligibility and/or to work up to
thirty-five hours per week.'88 In this way, recipients could
work off their benefits. If they refuse to follow these guidelines,
the GOP proposes expelling them from welfare. After the two-
year cycle, recipients would be required to provide unpaid com-
munity service to earn additional benefits or take minimum
wage public-sector work if they cannot find private-sector
jobs. 8 ' Liberals have attacked this proposal arguing that it is
not workfare but "slavefare."190
D. Making Work Pay
The final key to Clinton's reform package directly involves
the cash-transfer methods previously discussed. The administra-
tion proposes to "make work pay" through a three-part
plan.'
91
186. Rector, supra note 184.
187. Boot, infra note 190; Claiborne, supra note 175; Schneider, supra note 176;
Whitman & Cooper, supra note 167, at 30.
188. H.R. 3500, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
189. Id.
190. Max Boot, The Welfare Reform Conundrum, CHRisTIAN Sci. MONITOR, Oct. 6,
1993, at 9.
191. Schneider, supra note 176.
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First, the government will guarantee universal health-care
coverage. This element of the welfare reform proposal has al-
ready reached the stage of a formal proposal. 9'
Second, the administration wants to expand access to child
care. This would provide individuals who would otherwise have
to stay at home, the opportunity to find gainful employ-
ment.193 It is hoped that this would encourage significant
numbers of people to leave the welfare rolls.
Finally, the government proposes to significantly expand the
earned income tax credit. This component of the "making work
pay" reform element is already in place.' The government
has targeted the working poor for expansive credits in the hope
that this will result in families and individuals rising above the
poverty line. In effect, the Clinton Administration has made an
affirmative choice to use the EIC as its major cash-transfer
incentive program instead of implementing an NIT structure,
increasing the minimum wage, or providing a wage subsidy.
The new EIC provision is a major broadening of the previous
credit and brings the income tax into the foreground as a major
piece of the welfare system.
1. 1994 Earned Income Credit
The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993'9' signifi-
cantly increased the benefit levels and the categories of eligible
taxpayers under the earned income tax credit. 9 ' Effective in
1994, this new EIC will provide benefits to an additional cate-
gory of workers and will provide much higher maximum credits
for the traditional categories of eligible participants.
One major change in structure is the expansion of eligibility
to low income workers who do not have any qualifying children.
Specifically, the credit is now available to individuals age twen-
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. The earned income credit was expanded as part of the Clinton plan in 1993.
Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 13131(a)-(c), (d)(1) (applicable to taxable years beginning after
Dec. 31, 1993).
195. See supra, note 1.
196. Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 13131(a)-(c), (d)(1) (1993).
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ty-five or older, but less than sixty-five years of age who are
not dependents of others and who have a principal place of
abode in the U.S. for more than one-half of the taxableyear.
197
EIC 1994 0 Q.C.
$306
$4,000 $5.000 $9.000 E
Figure 10
The credit available to individuals with no qualifying children
is very limited as shown in figure 10.' For the 1994 taxable
year, the credit phases-in at a 7.65% rate up to a $4,000
earned income level.'99 This amounts to maximum credit of
only $306. The credit then phases-out at the same rate, 7.65%,
for earned income levels above $5,000, completely phasing-out
at earnings of $9,000.0'
197. I.R.C. § 32(c)(1)(A) (1993).
198. Based on amounts in recently amended I.R.C. § 32 (1993).
199. I.R.C. § 32(b)(1)(A).
200. Id.
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Figure 11
The credit amounts for workers with qualifying children are
significantly higher than they were in 1993.01 The amount of
the maximum credits available are a function of the phase-in
rate and the earnings cap which determines the length of the
phase-in range. For eligible individuals with one qualifying
child, the credit phases-in at 26.3% of earned income up to a
maximum earned income of $7,750 as shown in figure 11.202
This amounts to a maximum $2,038.25 credit. The phase-out of
benefits occurs for earned income levels above $11,000 and at
the more gradual rate of 15.98%. °0 Eligible individuals with
one qualifying child ("QC") do not receive any credit if they
enjoy earned income greater than or equal to $23,755.204
201. Prior to 1993, for workers with one qualifying child the credit phased-in at a
118.5% rate for a maximum credit of $1,434 at earnings above $7,749. Above $12,200
the credit then phased-out at 13.21% until completely phased-out at earnings of
$23,050. Workers with two qualifying children enjoyed a credit that phases-in at
19.5% for a maximum credit of $1,511 at earnings above $7,749. Above $12,200 the
credit then phased-out at 13.93% until completely phased-out at earnings of $23,050.
In 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 13131(a)-(c), (d)(1) significantly broadened the credit.
202. Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 13131(b)(1)(C).
203. Id. § 13131(b)(1)(B).
204. The credit phases-out at a 15.98% rate for earnings above $11,000. Thus, the
maximum credit amount of $2,038.25 phases-out completely at $23,755. ($23,755 -
$11,000) x .1598 = $2,038.25.
EIC 1994 1Q.C.
$2.038 - -
$11.000 $23.755 E
ig re 
11
$7.750
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For eligible individuals with one QC, the benefits phase-in
and phase-out more quickly than they did in 1993. Significant-
ly, the stationary range has been shortened under the new
scheme. The phase-out begins at an earnings level $1,200 less
than the 1993 phase-out threshold. 5
EIC 1994 2 Q.C.
$Z528 - -
I 
I
$ 0.25 $11.00 2,2 E
Figure 12
For eligible individuals with two or more QC, figure 12206
shows that the results are similar; faster phase-in and phase-
out of benefits with a shortened stationary period.2 7 The ef-
fect of these changes is to increase the benefits for eligible
individuals with one QC more than 42%.208 The increase for
eligible individuals with two or more QC is even more signifi-
cant. The maximum benefit level is now more than 62%
higher.20
9
The amended statute provides for a three year transition
period over which phase-in and phase-out rates will increase for
individuals with qualifying children due to an adjustment in
205. Under the pre-1993 amended EIC, the phase-out began at $12,200. The new
version of the EIC statute provides for a phase-out beginning at $11,000 of earnings
for individuals with one qualifying child. 26 I.R.C. § 32(b)(1)(C), (b)(2)(C) (1993).
206. Based on figures in amended I.R.C. § 32 (1993). See also Table 1.
207. See Table 1.
208. The maximum credit in 1993 for one QC was $1,434. In 1994, the maximum
credit is $2,038.25.
209. The maximum credit in 1993 for two QC was $1,511. In 1994, the maximum
credit is $2,527.50.
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the maximum earnings amount. The maximum credit level will
remain effectively the same for individuals with one qualifying
child and will experience a moderate increase for individuals
with two qualifying children over that period.21
This amounts to a major change in the role of the EIC. It
has moved from a support system limited to families with chil-
dren to a broader credit for all wage earners. Redistribution is
much greater, transforming the EIC from a band-aid provision
to offset the harsh effects of payroll taxes into a significant
measure for guaranteeing socially acceptable income levels for
the working poor.
Under the 1992 poverty levels, the 1994 EIC at the end of
the phase-in range provides sufficient income for eligible indi-
viduals with one QC to pass the poverty threshold.' Eligible
individuals with two QC or more would be just below the pov-
erty threshold. The credit for individuals without qualifying
children, however, would provide little more than half the rele-
vant poverty threshold income.
FIGURE 12-A
1994 1992 Poverty Max Credit
Status Threshold 212 at Min. Income
1 QC $9,212 $9,788.25
2 QC 11,280213 10,952.50
0 QC 7,202 4,306
210. The maximum credit level for individuals with one QC is $2,038.25 in 1994
and $2,040 in both 1995 and 1996. The two QC maximum credit is $2,527.50 in
1994, $3,033 in 1995, and $3,370 in 1996. See Table 1.
211. This observation is based on 1992 poverty thresholds. See POVERTY 1992,
supra note 121, at vii, Table A.
212. GREEN BOOK, supra note 4, at 1272.
213. Family of three persons.
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Clearly the administration has chosen to use the EIC to
effect a significant increase in cash-transfers under the welfare
umbrella. There is evidence that this will not be the only feder-
ally-guaranteed income change the Clinton Administration will
implement.
Labor Secretary Robert Reich is calling for an increase in the
minimum wage as a necessary complement to the earned in-
come tax expansion. 14 Reich argued that a fixed nominal min-
imum wage would decrease over time with inflation, requiring
continual expansion of the EIC just to maintain minimum wage
families at the same real income level.21 Without such an ex-
pansion, Reich argued, the fall in the real purchasing power of
the minimum wage would move more families into poverty. 16
Secretary Reich proposes to raise the minimum wage $.25 to
$4.50 per hour and to index that level to inflation."7 Thus,
although the full welfare reform proposal has not taken final
form, there is real evidence that a minimum wage increase will
be part of President Clinton's proposal.
V. CONCLUSION
Within the analytical framework of the seven goals of welfare
reform, the earned income tax credit wins high marks as a
viable method of redistribution to aid the working needy. As-
suming the goal is to target aid to those persons who fall below
their relevant poverty thresholds, yet are attempting to work
their way out of poverty, the Clinton Administration's expan-
sion of the EIC is a long stride toward a more effective welfare
system.
The present AFDC and Food Stamp programs lack effective
incentive systems to encourage recipients to enter the labor
214. Reich outlined his request for a minimum wage increase to President Clinton
in a recent memo. Reich Orders Review of Minimum Wage, Supports Indexing in
Memo to Clinton, 159 Daily Lab. Rep (BNA) No. 159, at AA-1 (Aug. 19, 1993). The
memo was supposed to be confidential, but was obtained by the Bureau of National
Affairs, Inc.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id.
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force and to strive to work longer hours. Without the addition
of such an incentive system, the welfare system will continue to
grow not only in budgetary requirements, but also in scope as
more people enter the welfare rolls and never leave.
The alternatives that have been proposed over the years
focus on different goals as the proper way to reform the welfare
system. By determining the true faults of AFDC and the Food
Stamp program, one defines the additional structure needed to
overhaul the present system into a viable system of temporary
redistribution. This system will in the long-run revitalize recipi-
ents, allowing them to reenter society as valuable contributors
to the economy as opposed to remaining a long-term expense
for our government.
The negative income tax proposals fail to offer a viable meth-
od to achieve this revitalization. Not only are most NIT recom-
mendations administratively difficult, complex, and costly, they
also fail to provide the necessary incentive structure to encour-
age individuals to enter the workforce.
The basic NIT structure with universal eligibility achieves
few welfare reform goals. In the form discussed, the NIT would
do little to eliminate poverty. Because it is poorly targeted to
help the working poor, the broad scope of possible benefit recip-
ients would entail a much lower level of transfer payments.
Even at such a low level, a basic NIT would be exorbitantly
costly.
The only advantage of the basic NIT is that it is equitable.
Its noncategorical nature implies parallel application to persons
with parallel income levels. Further, a noncategorical structure
implies that the present AFDC program's negative social effects
would not exist under an NIT. Instead of offering the highest
level of benefits only to families where a parent is missing, the
NIT provides benefits to all families."' However, this advan-
tage could be helpful only if the NIT was implemented to re-
place AFDC. If AFDC remains, the problems would remain at
the same magnitude.
218. This assumes a noncategorical NIT approach.
[Vol. 28:701756
THE EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT
The NIT could be implemented using a categorical approach.
By limiting eligibility, the NIT could be financially feasible but
at the cost of administrative complexity. However, the incentive
problems would remain, leading to the conclusion that the NIT
is not a viable reform option at present.
An increase in the minimum wage also fails to offer a viable
option. As with a basic NIT, the minimum wage is poorly tar-
geted to help the working poor. In fact, the majority of benefi-
ciaries would be teenagers who live in families with incomes
above the poverty thresholds.219
The most significant flaw in the minimum wage is the nega-
tive labor effects that any wage floor entails. Significant labor
dislocation and higher unemployment are the well-accepted
result of any minimum wage increase."2 The present state of
the economy can ill-afford such a further depressive influence to
productivity. Also, the labor dislocations expected from enact-
ment of the North American Free Trade Agreement22' alone
will be substantial enough without additional labor disruptions
caused by a rising minimum wage. 2
From a work-incentive standpoint, the minimum wage ranks
lowest. Far from offering encouragement to better oneself, the
minimum wage encourages a grant of extra income that is not
scaled or phased-in over any range. Significantly, it is American
business that foots the bill for this grant.2 '
American business will quickly restructure to more capital-
intensive operations to reduce the cost of labor.22 The effect is
long-term job loss and dislocation. Although the minimum wage
is easily the most cost-effective reform tool for the government,
it appears to be the most costly to American society as a whole.
219. See discussion supra part III.B.3.
220. See Shapiro, supra note 96, at 676.
221. North American Free Trade Agreement, Nov. 19, 1993, United States-Canada-
Mexico, 32 I.L.M. 296, State Dept. No. 94-28.
222. Christopher J. Graddock, The North American Free Trade Agreement: Econom-
ic Integration and Employment Dislocation, 19 J. LEGIS. 265, 278-80 (1993); Mexico:
Economist Argues Free Trade with Mexico Will Cause Adjustments in U.S. Workforce,
8 INT'L TRADE REP. 784 (1991).
223. See Shapiro, supra note 96.
224. Id. at 673-76 (discussing the capital-labor substitution effect).
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Acceptance of Labor Secretary Reich's recommendations would
clearly be a step in the wrong direction.
Finally, there is the wage subsidy. Often overlooked, this
proposal merits further consideration. A wage subsidy would go
far to eliminate poverty as it can be easily targeted to those
who are the most needy."' As a joint undertaking between
business, which manages payroll and can identify classes of
workers, and the government, which can budget the necessary
benefit amounts, a wage subsidy offers low administrative com-
plexity, low cost, and few negative social effects.
As with the NIT, the wage subsidy would have no effect on
the negative social effects that result from the AFDC structure.
However, the strong work incentive that results under the wage
subsidy provides strong impetus for workers to work their way
out of welfare and poverty-level incomes. Further, the wage
subsidy is an equitable method for redistribution because ease
of targeting allows more benefits to be channeled to the most
needy.
Unlike a minimum wage, a wage subsidy does not produce
disastrous labor market effects. If the Clinton Administration
decides it must increase low-level wages, the method should be
a categorical wage subsidy. In comparison, the minimum wage
is a dangerous government intervention into the market that
can only hurt American business in the increasingly competitive
global economy.
The broadened EIC is clearly a step in the right direction for
welfare reform. Unlike the alternatives, the EIC offers a equita-
ble redistribution, a strong incentive system (until income levels
reach those subject to positive taxation), and well-targeted ben-
efit allocation. As measured against the goals of welfare reform,
the EIC ranks highest among the four alternatives that have
been analyzed.
The broadened scope and increased credit amounts of the
1994 EIC translate into a significant increase in cost to govern-
ment revenue."' Funding for the expanded EIC will have to
225. See discussion in III.C.4; see also Shapiro, supra note 96, at 692-93.
226. The out-of-pocket cost for the expanded EIC is projected by President
Clinton's budget proposal for Fiscal Year 1994 to be $26,787 million over the next 5
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come from other programs. The basic problems underlying the
AFDC and Food Stamp programs suggest that their restructur-
ing could provide significant funds for earned income tax
credits.
The government has realized that the present income tax
structure overseen by the Internal Revenue Services offers an
easy and cost-effective administrative mechanism for channeling
welfare redistribution benefits to the working poor. The earned
income credit has moved from a remedial provision to a major
tax expenditure provision, serving a non-revenue raising pur-
pose. Hopefully, as Congress awakens to the potential of the
existing government revenue raising structure, further re-
finement of the American welfare system will result.
President Clinton, himself, expressed the potential of the
present revenue raising structure to help the working poor. In
his words, "the most important thing we can do in welfare
reform [is] to make a simple statement that if you have kids
and you work 40 hours a week, you will not be in poverty, we
will reward your work. The tax system will keep you out of.
poverty."
227
years. See Rector, supra note 184, at n.31.
227. Remarks to the Democratic Leadership Council, 29 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc.
2494 (Dec. 3, 1993).
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VI. APPENDICES
TABLE 1228
Earned Income Tax Credit
Year
1975
1976
1979
1985
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991:
1 QC
2 QC
1992:
1 QC
2 QC
1993:
1 QC
2 QC
1994:
1 QC
2 QC
0 QC
1995:
1 QC
2QC
0 QC
1996:
1 QC
2 QC
0 QC
E.
$4,000
$4,000
$5,000
$5,000
$6,080
$6,240
$6,500
$6,810
Cml
$400
$400
$500
$550
$851
$874
$910
$953
P.
10%
10%
12.5%
12.22%
10%
10%
10%
10%
E.
$4,000
$4,000
$6,000
$6,500
$6,920
$9,840
$10,240
$10,730
E$
$8,000
8,000
10,000
11,000
15,432
18,576
19,340
20,264
Pi
10%
10%
10%
11%
14%
14%
14%
14%
16.7%
17.3%
17.6%
18.4%
18.5%
19.5%
26.3%
30%
7.65%
34%
36%
7.65%
34%
40%
7.65%
$7,750
$8,425
$4,000
$6,000
$8,425
$4,000
$6,000
$8,425
$4,000
$2,038.25
$2,527.50
$306
$2,040
$3,033
$306
$2,040
$3,370
$306
15.98%
17.68%
7.65%
15.98%
20.22%
7.65%
15.98%
21.06%
7.65%
$11,000
$11,000
$5,000
$11,000
$11,000
$5,000
$11,000
$11,000
$5,000
23,755
25,296
9,000
23,766
26,000
9,000
23,766
27,002
9,000
228. Based on GREEN BOOK, supra note 4, at 1015.
$7,140 $1,192 11.93% $11,250 21,250
$7,140 $1,235 12.36% $11,250 21,250
$7,520 $1,324 12.57% $11,840 22,370
$7,520 $1,384 13.14% $11,840 22,370
$7,750 $1,434 13.21% $12,200 23,050
$7,750 $1,511 13.93% $12,200 23,050
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TABLE 221
Social Security Insurance Taxes
Employee
Maximum
$825
$895
$1,404
$2,792
$3,132
$3,380
$3,605
$3,924
$5,123
$5,329
$5,529
*$3,720
Self-
employed
rate
7.9%
8.0%
8.1%
12.75%
12.85%
13.57%
13.57%
13.85%
13.85%
13.85%
13.85%
13.85%
Timothy J. Eifler
229. Author's calculations based on CCH UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE REPORTER, §
31.3101-2, § 31.3121(a)(1)-1 (1993).
230. For the years prior to 1994, 1.45% of the employee rate consisted of the
OASDI tax. The OASDI tax is not figured into the 1994 calculations because, unlike
the remaining portion of the Social Security Insurance taxes, after 1993 the OASDI
portion is no longer capped at a specific wage level.
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Year
1975
1976
1979
1985
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
Employee
Rate'
5.85%
5.85%
6.13%
7.05%
7.15%
7.51%
7.51%
7.65%
7.65%
7.65%
7.65%
6.20%
Self-
employed
Maximum
$1,114
$1,224
$1,855
$5,049
$5,628
$6,107
$6,514
$7,105
$7,396
$7,687
$7,978
$8,310
Wage Limit
$14,100
$15,300
$22,900
$39,600
$43,800
$45,000
$48,000
$51,300
$53,400
$55,500
$57,600
$60,000

